This paper proposes the first implementation of a regular register by n servers that is tolerant to both mobile Byzantine agents, and transient failures (it is self-stabilizing) in a round-free synchronous model. We consider the most difficult model for mobile Byzantine agents to date where the message delay, δ, and the speed of mobile Byzantine agents, ∆, are completely decoupled. Moreover, servers are not aware of their state (infected or correct) after mobile Byzantine agents left them.
Introduction
time challenge in distributed computing. Initial results were mostly negative [8, 11, 21] due to the impossibility to distinguish a honest yet incorrectly initialized participant from a truly malicious one. On the positive side, two notable classes of algorithms use some locality property to tolerate Byzantine faults: space-local and time-local algorithms. Space-local algorithms [20, 21, 24] try to contain the fault (or its effect) as close to its source as possible. This is useful for problems where information from remote nodes is unimportant (such as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers). Time-local algorithms [12, 13, 14] try to limit over time the effect of Byzantine faults. Time-local algorithms presented so far can tolerate the presence of at most a single Byzantine node. Thus, neither approach is suitable to register emulation. To our knowledge, the problem of tolerating both arbitrary transient faults and mobile Byzantine faults has been considered in the literature only in round-based synchronous systems [4] . Our Contribution. We consider the problem of emulating a regular register in a network where both arbitrary transient faults and mobile Byzantine faults can occur, but where processes and Byzantine agent moves are decoupled. With respect to previous work on round-free register emulation [6] , we add the self-stabilization property, and bounded (memory) timestamps. With respect to previous results that are self-stabilizing and mobile Byzantine tolerant [4] , we consider the more relaxed round-free hypothesis, and bounded timestamps.
In more details, we present a regular register implementation that uses bounded timestamps from the Z 5 domain and is optimal with respect to the upper bound on the number of mobile Byzantine processes. The convergence time of our solution is upper bounded by 3∆ + T 5write() , where T 5write() is the time needed to execute five complete write() operations, each write() operation copleting in finite time.
System Model
We consider a distributed system composed of an arbitrary large set of client processes C and a set of n server processes S = {s 1 , s 2 . . . s n }. Each process in the distributed system (i.e., both servers and clients) is identified by a unique identifier. Servers run a distributed protocol emulating a shared memory abstraction and such protocol is totally transparent to clients (i.e., clients do not know the protocol executed by servers). The passage of time is measured by a fictional global clock (e.g., that spans the set of natural integers). Processes in the system do not have access at the fictional global time. At each time t, each process (either client or server) is characterized by its internal state, i.e., by the set of all its local variables and the corresponding values.
We assume that an arbitrary number of clients may crash while up to f servers are affected, at any time t, by Mobile Byzantine Failures. The Mobile Byzantine Failure adversarial model considered in this paper (and described in details below) is stronger than any other adversary previously considered in the literature [1, 3, 7, 15, 22, 23, 25] .
No agreement abstraction is assumed to be available at each process (i.e. processes are not able to use consensus or total order primitives to agree upon the current values). Moreover, we assume that each process has the same role in the distributed computation (i.e., there is no special process acting as a coordinator). Communication model. Processes communicate trough message passing. In particular, we assume that: (i) each client c i ∈ C can communicate with every server trough a broadcast() primitive, (ii) each server can communicate with every other server trough a broadcast() primitive, and (iii) each server can communicate with a particular client trough a send() unicast primitive. We assume that communications are authenticated (i.e., given a message m, the identity of its sender cannot be forged) and reliable (i.e., spurious messages are not created and sent messages are neither lost nor duplicated).
Synchronous System.
The system is round-free synchronous if: (i) the processing time of local computations (except for wait statements) are negligible with respect to communication delays, and are assumed to be equal to 0, and (ii) messages take time to travel to their destination processes. In particular, concerning point-to-point communications, we assume that if a process sends a message m at time t then it is delivered by time t + δ p (with δ p > 0). Similarly, let t be the time at which a process p invokes the broadcast(m) primitive, then there is a constant δ b (with δ b ≥ δ p ) such that all servers have delivered m at time t + δ b . For the sake of presentation, in the following we consider a unique message delivery delay δ (equal to δ b ≥ δ p ), and assume δ is known to every process. Moreover we assume that any process is provided with a physical clock, i.e., non corruptible. Computation model. Each process of the distributed system executes a distributed protocol P that is composed by a set of distributed algorithms. Each algorithm in P is represented by a finite state automata and it is composed of a sequence of computation and communication steps. A computation step is represented by the computation executed locally to each process while a communication step is represented by the sending and the delivering events of a message. Computation steps and communication steps are generally called events.
Definition 1 (Execution History)
Let P be a distributed protocol. Let H be the set of all the events generated by P at any process p i in the distributed system and let → be the happened-before relation. An execution historyĤ = (H, →) is a partial order on H satisfying the relation →.
Definition 2 (Valid State at time t) LetĤ = (H, →) be an execution history of a generic computation and let P be the corresponding protocol. Let p i be a process and let state p i be the state of p i at some time t. state p i is said to be valid at time t if it can be generated by executing P onĤ.
The Mobile Byzantine Failure (MBF) models considered so far in literature [1, 3, 7, 15, 22, 23, 25] assume that faults, represented by Byzantine agents, are controlled by a powerful external adversary that "moves" them from a server to another. Note that the term "mobile" does not necessary mean that a Byzantine agent physically moves from one process to another but it rather captures the phenomenon of a progressive infection, that alters the code executed by a process and its internal state.
Mobile Byzantine Models
As in the case of round-based MBF models [1, 3, 7, 15, 25] , we assume that any process previously infected by a mobile Byzantine agent has access to a tamper-proof memory storing the correct protocol code. However, a healed (cured) server may still have a corrupted internal state and cannot be considered correct. As a consequence, the notions of correct and faulty process need to be redefined when dealing with Mobile Byzantine Failures. 
Definition 3 (Correct process at time t) LetĤ
In this work we consider the (∆S, CU M ) MBF model [6] , that can be specified as follows. (∆S, * ) allows to consider coordinated attacks where the external adversary needs to control a subset of machines. In this case, compromising new machines will take almost the same time as the time needed to detect the attack or the time necessary to rejuvenate. This may represent scenarios with low diversity where compromising time depends only on the complexity of the exploit and not on the target server. More formally, the external adversary moves all the f mobile Byzantine Agents at the same time t and movements happen periodically (i.e., movements happen at time t 0 + ∆, t 0 + 2∆, . . . , t 0 + i∆, with i ∈ N). ( * , CU M ) represents situations where the server is not aware of a possible past infection. This scenario is typical of distributed systems subject to periodic maintenance and proactive rejuvenation. In this systems, there is a schedule that reboots all the servers and reloads correct versions of the code to prevent infections to be propagated in the whole network. However, this happens independently from the presence of a real infection and implies that there could be periods of time where the server execute the correct protocol however its internal state is not aligned with non compromised servers.
As in the round-based models, we assume that the adversary can control at most f Byzantine agents at any time (i.e., Byzantine agents are not replicating themselves while moving).
In our work, only servers can be affected by the mobile Byzantine agents 1 . It follows that, at any time t, |B(t)| ≤ f . However, during the system life time, all servers may be affected by a Byzantine agent (i.e., none of the server is guaranteed to be correct forever). In addition to the possibility of mobile Byzantine failures at server side, processes may also suffer form transient failures, i.e., local variables of any process (writer, reader, servers) can be arbitrarily modified [10] . It is nevertheless assumed that transient failures are quiescent, i.e., there exists a time τ no tr (which is unknown to the processes) after which no new transient failures happens.
Regular Register Specification
A register is a shared variable accessed by a set of processes, i.e. clients, through two operations, namely read() and write(). Informally, the write() operation updates the value stored in the shared variable while the read() obtains the value contained in the variable (i.e. the last written value). In distributed settings, every operation issued on a register is, generally, not instantaneous and it can be characterized by two events occurring at its boundary: an invocation event and a reply event.
An operation op is complete if both the invocation event and the reply event occur (i.e. the process executing the operation does not crash between the invocation and the reply). Contrary, an operation op is said to be failed if it is invoked by a process that crashes before the reply event occurs. According to these time instants, it is possible to state when two operations are concurrent with respect to the real time execution. For ease of presentation we assume the existence of a fictional global clock (unknown to the processes) and the invocation time and response time of every operation are defined with respect to this fictional clock. Given two operations op and op ′ , their invocation event times (t B (op) and t B (op ′ )) and their reply event times (t E (op) and t E (op ′ )), we say that op precedes op ′ (op ≺ op ′ ) iff t E (op) < t B (op ′ ). If op does not precede op ′ and op ′ does not precede op, then op and op ′ are concurrent (op||op ′ ). Given a write(v) operation, the value v is said to be written when the operation is complete. We assume that locally any client never performs read() and write() operation concurrently (i.e., for any given client c i , the set of operations executed by c i is totally ordered). We also assume that initially the register stores a default value ⊥ written by a fictional write(⊥) operation happening instantaneously at round r 0 . In case of concurrency while accessing the shared variable, the meaning of last written value becomes ambiguous. Depending on the semantics of the operations, three types of register have been defined by Lamport [16] : safe, regular and atomic.
In this paper, we consider a Self-Stabilizing Single-Writer/ Multi-Reader (SWMR) regular register, i.e., an extension of Lamport's regular register that considers transitory failures.
The Self-Stabilizing Single-Writer/Multi-Reader (SWMR) register is specified as follow:
• ss − Termination: Any operation invoked on the register eventually terminates.
• ss − Validity: There exists a time τ stab such that each read operation invoked at time t > τ stab returns the last value written before its invocation, or a value written by a write() operation concurrent with it.
Bonomi et al. [6] proved the necessity of an additional maintenance() operation, executed regularly, to cope with the Byzantine agent moves between read() and write() operations. This result naturally extends to our case, as a self-stabilizing algorithm, once stabilized, must provide the same guarantees as a nonstabilizing one. [6] .
Theorem 1 Let
Proof Let us assume that such algorithm P reg = {A R , A W } exists, i.e., after the end of transient failures it provides a self-stabilized safe register. If P reg is correct, it means that both A R and A W implementing respectively the read() and the write() operation terminates i.e., they stop to execute steps when the operation is completed. Let t > τ stab be the time at which the last operation op terminated and let us assume that no other operation is invoked until time t ′ > t. Let us note that during the time interval [t, t ′ ] no algorithm is running as all the operations issued in the past are completed. As a consequence, no correct server and no cured server change its state. However, considering that t ′ does not depend on P reg (i.e., it is not controlled by the register protocol but it is defined by clients) and considering the mobility of the Mobile Byzantine agents, we may easily have a run where every correct server is faulty and its state can be corrupted at some time in [t, t ′ ]. Considering that P reg = {A R , A W } and that A R and A W are not running in [t, t ′ ] we can have that every server stores a non valid state at time t ′ and the register value is lost. As a consequence, A R Table 1 : Parameters for P Rreg Protocol.
has no way to read a valid value and the validity property is violated. It follows that P reg is does not exist and we have a contradiction. ✷ T heorem 1
Regular Register implementations
Our self-stabilizing regular register emulation is composed of three parts: the write operation, the read operation, and the maintenance operation prescribed by our execution model.The write() and read() algorithms follow the classical quorum-based implementations. The first is in charge of writing on enough servers such that there are enough correct servers able to reply when a read() operation occurs. The maintenance() operation is in charge to keep the number of correct servers above the thresholds in Table 1 despite mobile Byzantine movements.The tricky part of the algorithm is to employ bounded timestamps from the domain Z 5 in such a way to always define a total order on the written values with respect to their timestamps. Each written value is represented as val, sn where val is the content and sn the corresponding sequence number, sn ∈ Z 5 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Let us define two operations on such values: addition:
That is, the number that added to b gives 0 as result, i.e., b + 5 (−b) = 0.
P reg Detailed Description
Our emulation, protocol P reg , is described in Figures 2 -4 . Local variables at client c i . Each client c i maintains a set reply i that is used during the read() operation to collect the three tuples j, v, sn sent back from servers. Additionally, c i maintains a local sequence number csn that is incremented, respect to the Z 5 arithmetic, each time it invokes a write() operation, which is timestamped with such sequence number.
Local variables at server s i . Each server s i maintains the following local variables:
. This array, when a server is correct is expected to be completely filled with three values. This set is reset and repopulated at each maintenance() operation.
• F W i : a set that contains elements val k , sn k , sn k ∈ Z 5 . This set may contain up to three values, depending on how many consecutive write() operations occur in δ. Such set is populated with values, due to a write() operation, that have been forwarded #reply times by servers. It is emptied during the maintenance() at most every δ time.
• W i : is the set where servers store values coming directly from the writer, including an epoch value, v, sn, epoch . epoch is set to 1 at the beginning and is decreased by maintenance() operations.
Values from this set are deleted when the same value appears in the F W set or when epoch reaches the (−1) value.
• echo vals i and echo read i : two sets used to collect information propagated trough ECHO messages at the beginning of the maintenance() operation. echo vals i stores vectors vec j whose elements are v, sn, epoch j propagated by servers s j . Every vec j is the concatenation of V j (which is a vector itself) and W j , which is a set whose elements can be ordered with respect to their timestamp. The semantic of the epoch variable is the same as in W j . trunc(echo vals i ), with a slightly abuse of notation, is the set {trunc(vec j , 3), ∀vec j ∈ echo vals i }. Finally, echo read i stores the identifiers of concurrently reading clients in order to notify cured servers about them.
• f w vals i : set variable storing a triple v, sn, epoch j meaning that server s j forwarded a write message with value v and sequence number sn. The semantic of the epoch variable is the same as in W i .
• pending read i : set variable used to collect identifiers of the clients that are currently reading.
In order to simplify the code of the algorithm, let us define the following functions:
• select three pairs max sn(echo vals i ): this function takes as input the set echo vals i whose values vec j are the result of conCut(V j , W j ). That function returns, if there exist, the three newest tuples v, sn , such that there exist at least #echo occurrences in echo vals i of such tuple. If there are less than three tuples, the remaining tuples returned are ⊥, 0 .
• select value(reply i ): this function takes as input the reply i set of replies collected by client c i and returns the pair v, sn occurring #reply times. If there are more pairs occurring enough times, it returns the newest.
• older(Set): given a set of values, whose associated timestamps belong to Z 5 , then such function returns the older value among those in Set.
• trunc(V ector, index): takes as input an array and returns the last index elements.
• conc(V ector, Set): takes as input an array V ector and a set Set, assuming that is it possible to order univocally elements in Set, and returns the concatenation V ector • Set.
• conCut(V i , W i ) takes as input the array V i and the set W i . Since we can order the elements in W i with respect to their timestamp, then we manage it as a vector. Such function first concatenates them: V ector ← conc(V i , W i ), removes ⊥, ⊥ elements and returns trunc(V ector, 3).
which is composed by the last three values different from ⊥, ⊥ .
In the following we present a general view of our algorithm. Maintenance operation. Such operation is executed by servers periodically at times 
Now each server is ready to broadcast an ECHO message with the result of conc(V i , W i ) and the set pending read i (it contains identifiers of clients that are currently running a read() operation). After δ time units, servers try to update their state by checking the number of occurrences of each pair v, sn received with ECHO messages. In particular, the first empties the V set and then they try to update such set by invoking select three pairs max sn(echo vals i ) function which populates V with at least one tuple v, sn . If there is only one tuple v, sn , s i can deduce that there exists a concurrent write() operations that are updating the register value concurrently with the maintenance() operation. Thus, s i considers ⊥, 0 as the pair associated to the value that is concurrently written. After that it checks if there are values in F W i . In that case the function INSERT is invoked on such values and F W i is emptied. Such function tries to insert the value in the proper position in
) and then checks if the vector is properly defined invoking the check function. If not, V i is reseted and the value is inserted in V [2] . Finally server starts replying to clients that are currently reading. The same check on F W i and insertion in V i is performed after ∆ − δ time during the maintenance() operation. Notice that this second check happens if ∆ > δ. Write operation. When the write() operation is invoked, the writer increments csn ← csn + 5 1, sends WRITE(vcsn) to all servers and finally returns after δ time.
For each server s i , two cases may occurs: (case 1) s i delivers WRITE( v, csn ) message when it is not affected by a Byzantine agent; (case 2) s i delivers WRITE(vcsn) message when it is affected by a Byzantine agent. case 1 s i stores v in W and forward it to every servers sending the WRITE FW(i, v, csn ) message. Then it is echoed at the beginning of each maintenance() operation as long as v is in W i or V i . In order for v to be in V i it has to appear enough times in f w vals i ∪ echo vals i , when it happens v is inserted in F W i . At the next check on F W i , during the maintenance() operation, v is removed from F W i and inserted in V i . case 2 When s i is no more affected it can deliver v with both WRITE FW(j, v, csn ) message and ECHO(j, V j ∪W j , pending read i ) message, so that v goes to populate the f w vals i ∪echo vals i set. When there are enough occurrences, v is stored in F W i and at the next check on F W i , during the maintenance() operation, v is removed from F W i and inserted in V i . Read operation. At client side, when the read() operation is invoked at client c i , it empties the reply i set and sends to all servers the READ(i) message. Then c i waits 2δ time, while the reply i set is populated with servers replies, and from such set it picks the values occurring enough times invoking select value(reply i ) and returns it. Notice that before returning c i sends to every server the read termination notification, READ ACK(i) message. At server side when s j delivers the READ(i) message, client c i identifier is stored in the pending read j set. Such set is part of the content of ECHO message in every maintenance() operation, which populates the echo read j set, so that cured servers can be aware of the reading clients. After, s j invokes conCut(V j , W j ) function to prepare the reply message for c i . The result of such function is sent back to c i in the REPLY message. Such message is also computed and sent at the end of each maintenance() operation, in the case s j was affected by Byzantine agent. Finally a REPLY message containing just one value is sent when a new value is added in F W j and there are clients in the pending read j ∪ echo read j set. When the READ ACK(i) message is delivered from c i then its identifier is removed from the pending read j and echo read j sets.
Correctness
Let us fist characterize the correct system behavior, i.e., when the protocol is correctly executed after τ stab (the end of the transient failure). To prove the correctness of P reg , we first demonstrate that the termination property is satisfied i.e, that read() and write() operations terminates. Let us note that the termination property is independent from the specific instance of the MBF model considered.
Lemma 1 If a correct client c i invokes write(v) operation at time t then this operation terminates at time t + δ.
Proof The claim simply follows by considering that a write confirmation event is returned to the writer client c i after δ time, independently of the servers behavior (see lines 03-04, Figure 3) .
else epochCheck(W i ); (04) endIf; (05) epochCheck(echo vals i ); epochCheck(f w vals i );
11) wait(δ); (12) V ← ⊥; (13) set tmp ← select three pairs max sn(echo vals i ); (14) while set tmp = ⊥ do (15) insert(V i , older(set tmp)); (16) set tmp ← set tmp \ older(set tmp); (17) endWhile; 
-----------------------
when REPLY (j, V W ) is received: (07) for each ( v, sn ∈ V W ) do (08) reply i ← reply i ∪ { v, sn j }; (09) endFor when READ (j) is received: (10) pending read i ← pending read i ∪ {j}; (11) send REPLY (i, conCut(V i , W i )); (12) broadcast READ FW(j); ------------------------ when READ FW (j) is received: (13) pending read i ← pending read i ∪ {j}; ------------------------ when READ ACK (j) is received:(
Lemma 2 If a correct client c i invokes read() operation at time t then this operation terminates at time t + 2δ.
Proof The claim simply follows by considering that a read() returns a value to the client after 2δ time, independently of the behavior of the servers (see lines 03-06, Figure 4) . ✷ Lemma 2
Theorem 2 (ss-Termination) Any operation invoked on the register eventually terminates.
Proof The proof simply follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. 
Proof Let us start considering that at T i there are #echo correct servers storing
and running the code in Figure 2 . Each server broadcasts an ECHO() message whose content is conCut(V i , W i ) (line 08). Let op W 1 be a write() operation, such that T i ∈ [t B (W 1), t E (W 1)] and let v 3 , sn 3 be the value to be written. When a non Byzantine server delivers a WRITE() message v 3 , sn 3 ∈ W i set (Figure 3 line 06) . Since T i ∈ [t B (W 1), t E (W 1)], at the beginning of the maintenance() operation non all correct servers have v 3 , sn 3 ∈ W i . Thus, #echo servers in Co(
Byzantine servers s i select values occurring at least #echo times setting
At T i + δ it may also happen that another write() operation, op W 2 occurs. Let v 4 , sn 4 be the value written by op W 2 subsequent to op W 1 , such that
In that case it may happen that all servers that were in Co(t) and are now in Co(t + δ) delivers the WRITE( v 4 , sn 4 ) message and no yet the servers that were in Cu(T i ). So that the first group of servers is storing in V ∪ W , { v 1 , 1 , v 2 , 2 , { v 3 , 3 } and the second group is storing { v 2 , 2 , v 3 , 3 , v 4 , 4 }. All of those servers are storing v 2 , 2 in common, which is the last written value respecting to T i , concluding the proof.
✷ Lemma 4
Corollary 1
The maintenance() operation guarantees that ∀T i , i ∈ N, ∀s ∈ Cu(T i ), then s ∈ Co(T i + δ).
Definition 9 (Faulty servers in the interval I) Let us define asB[t, t + T ] the set of servers that are affected by a Byzantine agent for at least one time unit in the time interval [t, t + T ]. More formallỹ B[t, t + T ] = τ ∈[t,t+T ] B(τ ).

Definition 10 (M axB(t, t + T )) Let [t, t+T ] be a time interval. The cardinality ofB(t, t+T ) is maximum if for any
Proof For simplicity let us consider a single agent ma 1 , then we extend the reasoning to all the f agents.
In the [t, t + T ] time interval, with T ≥ δ, ma 1 can affect a different server each ∆ time. It follows that the number of times it may "jump" from a server to another is T ∆ . Thus the affected servers are at most ⌈ T ∆ ⌉ plus the server on which ma 1 is at t. Finally, extending the reasoning to f agents, M axB(t, t+T ) = (⌈ T ∆ ⌉+1)f , concluding the proof.
✷ Lemma 5
Lemma 6 Let op be a read() operation issued at time t and terminating at time t+2δ. Let M axB(t, t+2δ) be the maximum number of servers that can be faulty for at least one time unit in the interval
[t, t + 2δ]. If (i) k∆ ≥ 2δ (with k ∈ {1, 2}) and (ii) n ≥ 2(k + 1)f + 1, then |Co(t, t + δ)| > |M axB([t, t + 2δ])| + |Cu(t)|.
Proof
• Case 1 -(∆S, CU M ) with 2δ ≤ ∆.
Let us note that the maximum number of faulty servers in any interval [t, t + 2δ] is strictly related to the ∆ value. From Lemma 5, M axB(t, t + 2δ) = (⌈ 2δ ∆ ⌉ + 1) × f . Considering that δ ≤ ∆ < 2δ, we obtain M axB(t, t + 2δ) = 3f . In addition to Byzantine servers, in the (∆S, CU M ) model also cured servers may send a reply. Let us consider that the maintenance() operation code run in δ time. At any T i servers sends their value and after δ time the collected values are analyzed. Thus we can consider that δ time is enough to terminate the maintenance() operation). It follows that for each Byzantine server there can be only one server that is in the cured state (the one that was previously affected by the same agent) whose become correct before the agent affect another server. Thus there are, in the worst case, f more non correct servers that may reply. It follows that |Cu(t)| ≤ f .
The number of correct servers at time t + δ is given by the number of serves that are non-faulty in the whole interval (n − M axB(t, t + 2δ) − |Cu(t)| = f ) plus the number of server that were not correct at time t but that had "enough" time to terminate the maintenance operation before time t + δ (i.e., M axB(t, t + 2δ) − M axB(t + δ, t + 2δ)). On the other side, if a sever s i begins a read() operation in a cured state, then the agent left s i at most t − δ + 1. Thus, it can not move again before t + δ. Thus the server that will be affected after t + δ is correct at t + δ. So, there are as many servers being correct at t and faulty after as much as the servers in |Cu(t)| = f . Finally each servers in |Cu(t)| has the time to became correct at time t + δ (for Corollary 1).
• Case 2 -(∆S, CU M ) with δ ≤ ∆ < 2δ. Following the consideration done in Case 1, we obtain that M axB(t, t + 2δ) = 3f for δ ≤ ∆ < 2δ and also |Cu(t) = f |. Note that in this case, the presence of |Cu(t)| does not implies an extra presence of the same amount of server that are correct at t + δ and then became faulty. Thus we have that:
From which the claim follows.
Considering the worst case scenario where each message sent to and by non correct servers is instantaneously delivered, while each message sent to and by correct servers needs δ time, from Lemma 6 the next corollary follows Corollary 2 Let op be a read() operation issued at time t and terminating at time t + 2δ. The number of replies sent by correct servers at some time τ ∈ [t, t + 2δ] is always greater than the number of replies sent by non correct servers.
Definition 11 (write() completion time t wE ) Let write() be an operation op W writing v on the register. t wE is the time after which, if a read() operation occurs, there are always at least #reply correct servers that reply with v.
For simplicity let us first prove that the algorithm as it has been presented in [5] works, even if we consider the three values result of conCut(V, W ), instead of V ∪ W , assuming we can order them from the oldest to the newest. The main difference is that in [5] all values in V ∪ W are ordered by sequential timestamp. This is not true in conCut(V, W ), but those values can be univocally order from the oldest to the newest. Such proof is moved after.
Lemma 7
Let op be a write(v) operation invoked by a correct client at time t B (op) = t, then the write completion time t wE ≤ t + 2δ.
Proof To prove this Lemma we have to prove that by time t wE ≤ t + 2δ, v is always in conCut(V, W ) in #reply correct servers. Due to the communication channel synchrony, WRITE messages are delivered by servers within the time interval [t, t + δ]; any server s j ∈ Co(t, t + δ) executes the correct algorithm code. Thus, when s j delivers WRITE message it checks if the value is already stored (line 05, Figure 3) , otherwise it executes line 06 storing the value in W j and setting the associated epoch to 1.
Let us consider case k = 2. By time tE(op W ) there are n − M axB(t B (op W ), t E (op W )) ≥ #reply servers able to reply with v to a read() operation. This is true up to the next Byzantine agent movement
] then the hypothesis of Lemma 3 does not hold (there are no #echo servers having the same vector V , such that v ∈ V ), so that at T i there are at least #reply − f servers that can reply with messages whose content is v, whose are not enough. Since #reply − f = #echo then at T i there are enough correct servers that during the maintenance() that send v in the ECHO() message. So for Lemma 3 at T i+1 all correct servers are able to reply with v. What is left to prove is that t wE ∈ [T i , T i+1 ] and t wE ≤ t + 2δ. During the write() operation there are at least n − M axB(t B (op W ), t E (op W )) ≥ #reply = 4f + 1 servers always correct, Co(t B (op W ), t E (op W )). Let B(t B (op W ), T i−1 ) the set of servers that missed the WRITE(v) message. Some servers in Co(t B (op W ), t E (op W )) may deliver the WRITE() message before of after T i−1 , and thus send the WRITE FW() message before of after T i−1 . In the first case the WRITE FW() message can be lost as well, but v is also present in the result of conCut(V, W ) (Figure 3 line 06) and sent at T i−1 in the ECHO() message (Figure 2 line 08) so that servers in B(t B (op W ), T i−1 ) deliver it at most at T i + δ. In the second case, the WRITE FW() message is sent by servers in the time interval [T i−1 , t E (op)] (Figure 3 line  11) . Since a message is delivered at most after δ time, is it true that at most at t E (op) + δ = t + 2δ any servers that missed the write() message has now enough occurrence of it in the f w vals i ∪ echo vals i set so that line 13 in Figure 3 by time t + 2δ is executed storing v in F W i , which is sent back to any reading client, concluding the proof. If k = 1 the proof structure is similar.
✷ Lemma 7
Considering Lemma 7 and that every time t > t no tr the function insert(V, v) is invoked, ∃k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, V [k] = v (every branch of such function ends with an insertion), then the following Corollary holds. Proof The proof follows directly from Lemma 7 and considering that if there a no more write() operation W = ∅, so at every maintenance() operation there are at least #echo servers storing v ∈ V so that v ∈ conCut(V, W ).
Corollary 3 Let
✷ Lemma 8 Proof The proof simply follows considering that:
• for Lemma 8 if there are no more write() operation then v, after t E w, is in the register forever.
• any new written value eventually is stored in vector V (cf. Figure 2 line 12 or line 15) whose dimension is three.
• write() operation occur sequentially. write() From that after three write() operations, op W k+1 , op W k+2 , op W k+3 , v is no more stored in the regular register. ✷ Lemma 9
Let us now finally prove that the result of conCut(V, W ) is compliant to the expected behavior that we would have from V ∪ W set of elements ordered with respect to sequential timestamps. Proof The proof follows considering that, the algorithm depicted in Figure 3 generates timestamps in a sequence and that in F W i , for Lemma 10 there are at most 3 elements whose belong to a legal subsequence. Let op W k , op W k+1 , op W k+2 be the three subsequent write() operations that respectively generate v k , v k+1 , v k+2 ∈ F W i whose respective timestamps are z, z + 5 1, z + 5 2. Since those elements are sequentially generated then for each couple of them the difference between those timestamps is at most 2. Let us consider a couple of elements v k and v k+2 , two cases are possible: (i) v k has been generate before v k+2 or (ii) vice versa. Let us suppose that case (ii) is true, so that v k+2 has been generate before v k . Computing z − 5 z + 2 = 3, which would mean that those two values belong to a sequence of four values, but in F W i there is at most a sequence of three values (Lemma 10). It follows that case (1) is the only possible one, where z + 2 − 5 z = 2. Figure 6 provides Basically we can say that thanks to the maintenance() operation and the forwarding mechanism, when a read() operation op R begins at time t B (op R ), at time t B (op R ) + δ there are #reply correct servers that reply with a value v ∈ V V S(t B (op R )). Proof The proof simply follows considering that Theorems 2-3 proved that P Rreg works with bounds provided in Table 1 . Those match the previously known lower bounds [6] for the (∆S, CU M ) model.
Lemma 10
What is left to prove are the necessary conditions for the system to self-stabilize after τ no tr .
Lemma 14
Let t > τ no tr , then after 3∆ for any server s i , the effect of transient failures disappear in all variables but V i and echo val i .
Proof After τ no tr , all non Byzantine servers s i execute the correct code of the algorithm. So that at the beginning of every maintenance() operations F W i is emptied and the EPOCHCHECK() function is invoked on W i , echo vals i and f w vals i sets. So that values populate these sets for at most the time needed for two maintenance() operations. In fact, the epoch associated to each value has to be in the set {0, 1} which is decreased by 1 at the beginning of every maintenance() operation. When epoch / ∈ {0, 1} the element associated to it is deleted. Thus, in the worst case scenario epoch is set to 1. During the first maintenance() operation, it is decreased to 0. During the second maintenance() operation is decreased to 1. At the next one epoch / ∈ {0, 1} and so is deleted. Follows that after 2∆ time those sets, W i and f w vals i , are cleaned which is not true for echo vals i and V i whose are populated at each maintenance() operation. Since the end of the transient failures is not aligned to the maintenance() operations we consider a ∆ time more.
✷ Lemma 14 Proof From Lemma 14, after τ no tr + 3∆ all variables but V i and echo vals i , for every s i not Byzantine, are cleaned from the effect of transient failures. So that in order to have a stabilized system V i has to be completely populated with values belonging to correctly invoked write() operations, i.e., operation invoked after τ no tr . Since V i by definition contains 3 values, then at most 3 write() operations are necessary. Is it to prove that at most two extra write() operations can occur. At the beginning of any maintenance() operation is invoked the function check(V i ). So that this set can be in one of the following states (for simplicity we represent each element by its timestamp ts and we omit the modulo operation 2 ):
Lemma 15
a. V i = ts k , ts k+1 , ts k+2 ;
b. V i = ts k , ts k+1 , ts k+3 ;
c. V i = ⊥, ⊥, ⊥;
d. V i = ⊥, ⊥, ts k ;
e. V i = ⊥, ts k , ts k+1 ;
f. V i = ⊥, ts k , ts k+2 ;
Let us consider the following legal sequence: ts k−1 , ts k+1 , ts k , ts k+2 , . . . 3 and the state (d.) V i = ⊥, ⊥, ts k . The result of the invocation of INSERT on V i and ts k−1 is V i = ⊥, ta k−1 , ts k . The value after, ts k+1 produces the following legal state V i = ts k−1 , ts k , ts k+1 . Finally the value after ts k , since it is already in V i produces the following state V i = ⊥, ⊥, ts k . The hereafter values to be inserted belong to a legal sequence as the value in V i , so that after two more write() operations V i is in a legal sequence and all the next values are legal value. To generalize, after the third write() operation, if V i contains only values coming from a legal sequence (i.e., ⊥ has never been inserted in the previous three insertions), then all the next values are legal values, since the values in V i belong to the same legal sequence. This mean that there can not be more than two extra write() operation in addiction to the three necessary ones. From now on, values in V i and F W i are consecutive elements of a legal sequence. So that every older element in F W i is a legal value for V i , in other words, any time that a new value has to be inserted in V i such operation succeed, which is true for each correct server. ✷ Lemma 15
Concluding remarks
We proposed a self-stabilizing regular register emulation in a network where both arbitrary transient faults and mobile Byzantine faults can occur, and where processes and Byzantine agent moves are decoupled. Our solution improves the existing work considering mobile Byzantines faults [6, 4] in several key aspects: (i) it is the first self-stabilizing regular register implementation in round-free synchronous communication model, and(ii) it uses bounded timestamps from the Z 5 domain. All these improvements have no additional cost with respect to the number of replicas that are necessary to tolerate f mobile Byzantine processes: that is, our solution is optimal with respect to established lower bounds [6] . Additionally, the convergence time of our solution is upper bounded by 3∆ + T 5write() , where T 5write() is the time needed to execute five complete write() operations, each write() operation completing in finite time. An interesting future research direction is to study upper and lower bounds for (i) memory, and (ii) convergence time complexity of self-stabilizing register emulations tolerating mobile Byzantine faults.
